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After the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY) entered into a long political and economic crisis. The 
period saw increased Greater-Serbian nationalism directed against a state 
whose federal framework had been based on its 1974 Constitution. The 
engagement of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in the resolution of the 
crisis showed that Greater-Serbian ideas deeply penetrated that institution. 
Serbs composed the largest share of the members of the JNA and for years it 
promoted an image of itself as the last defender of Tito’s heritage. The JNA 
became “an important political factor” and a shield protecting the country’s 
socialist system. It could not remain a peaceful observer of political chang-
es in the SFRY.1
The JNA, together with Territorial Defense forces (TO), constituted the 
armed forces of the SFRY.2 The TO had been an organization of each of the 
SFRY’s constituent republics. It had less arms than the JNA and had been 
designed primarily to control territory.3 The JNA and TO had been creat-
ed to be fully equal and in war-time circumstances they had to complement 
each other in accordance with the national military strategy of “total nation-
al resistance.” Like the JNA which came under the competency of the SFRY 
Note: All documents, unless noted otherwise, are in the possession of the Ministry of 
Defence of the Republic of Croatia.
* Davor Marijan, MA, Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Republic of Croatia 
1 The special status of the Yugoslav Army, known as the JNA since 1951, had stemmed 
from the Second World War.  Its commander Josip Broz Tito had been Yugoslavia’s most 
important political leader.  After the War, “the special status of JNA had initially been measu-
red by its the special bonds with [Tito], which had been continuously supplemented by gai-
ning new areas of exclusiveness.  Its revolutionary pedigree had been supplemented by its 
role as the guard of the purity of the idea of socialism and by its achievements.  Its monopo-
ly over the defence of the country against foreign aggression had been gradually extended, 
but had also been redirected to the internal defence of the party (ideological) values and aims 
of the order.”  Miroslav Hadžić, “Armijska upotreba trauma,” in Srpska strana rata (Beograd: 
Republika, 1996), p. 562.
2 Strategija općenarodne obrane i društvene samozaštite SFRJ (Beograd: Savezni sekretarijat 
za narodnu obranu (in further text: SSNO), 1987), pp. 54-56.
3 Strategija oružane borbe (Beograd: SSNO, 1983), pp. 69, 109-110.
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Presidency, in peace-time the TO came under the competency of republi-
can and provincial leaderships which gained additional influence after Tito’s 
death.4
In the mid-1980s, a new reorganisation of the JNA had been initiated 
under the “Jedinstvo” (Unity) Plan. With respect to land forces, the Plan dis-
solved the JNA’s six armies and one separate corps which had oversight of 
various territories which, except for Croatia and Serbia, had been roughly 
equivalent to that of the republics. The Plan replaced them with military dis-
tricts composed of corps. The reorganisation resulted in three military dis-
tricts as well as a naval district and the Air Force (with anti-aircraft defense 
forces). The military leadership preceded their long-term goal to reorga-
nise the JNA by convincing various federal bodies that establishing mili-
tary district commands covering two or three republics would not deprive 
the republics and provinces of their rights and obligations in the country’s 
defense and would allow the JNA to centralise its affairs in war- and peace-
times. The SFRY Presidency accepted the JNA’s proposal as a result of which 
republican and provincial TO commands would in war-time became subor-
dinate to military district commands while TO units would fall under con-
trol of corps.5
On 25 December 1998, the 5th Military District Command based in Zagreb 
began its operations under its peace-time structure (in times of war, the 
District would be known as the Command of the Northwest District). The 
District covered Slovenia, northwest Croatia, a part of Istria, Gorski Kotar, 
Lika, Kordun and Banovina. In 1988, the JNA established four corps in the 
District. Two of them, the 14th Corps with its headquarters in Ljubljana and 
the 31st Corps based in Maribor, had been located in Slovenia. The north-
ern part of Istria and the Croatian Littoral (Hrvatsko Primorje) came under 
the oversight of the 13th Corps based in Rijeka. Northwestern Croatia came 
under the competence of the 32nd Corps whose headquarters had been 
located in Varaždin. A large part of Kordun came under the competence of 
the 6th Proletarian Infantry Division based in Karlovac, while Zagreb and its 
surrounding area constituted a special Command for the defense of the city 
of Zagreb.
The 5th Military District received air support from the 5th Corps of the Air 
Force and its antiaircraft defense based in Zagreb. The 1st Military District 
and the Naval District divided the remainder of Croatia between them. The 
Belgrade –based 1st Military District covered Slavonia through its 17th Corps 
based in Tuzla. The new Naval District with its command in Split retained 
4 Branko Mamula, Slučaj Jugoslavija (Podgorica: CID, 2000), pp. 49, 55.
5 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945-1985, volume 7/I, Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbra-
nu (Beograd: VINC, 1990), pp. 375-376; B. Mamula, Slučaj Jugoslavija, pp. 59-68.  The JNA’s 
reorganisation of JNA had been followed by intensive preparation for war by its highest-
ranking officers through the command-staff combat exercise “Romanija” 1987-1990 (which 
had been based on a scenario in which NATO attacked Yugoslavia). Davor Domazet-Lošo, 
Hrvatska i veliko ratište (Zagreb: Udruga sv. Jurja, 2002), pp. 56-61.
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most of the prior structure and fleet, but contained a novelty in having 
attached to it the newly established 9th Corps. As a result, the Naval District 
had oversight of the Adriatic coast and part of northern Dalmatia which 
came under the zone of operations of the 9th Corps based in Knin. The 5th 
Naval Sector based in Pula had responsibility for the northern part, the 8th 
Naval Sector based in Šibenik had responsibility for the central part, and 9th 
Naval Sector based in Kumbor in Boka Kotorska had responsibility for the 
southern part of the Adriatic Coast.6
Major changes on the world’s political scene following the disintegration of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the end of the bipolar division of 
the world opened the door to democratic changes in the SFRY, especially in 
its western part. The parties that emerged on the political scene included the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) which won the first multiparty elections in 
the Socialist Republic of Croatia in April 1990. Like Slovenia, Croatia sought to 
transform Yugoslavia into a confederate state, which provoked strong opposi-
tion in the eastern part of the SFRY where Communists remained in power.7
The HDZ’s electoral victory proved to be the signal for federal armed 
forces to interfere with Croatia’s moves towards sovereignty. On 22 May 
1990, only a few days before HDZ took power in Croatia, the JNA took 
control of the TO’s weapons in Croatia and removed them to JNA depots.8 
This occurred pursuant to an order issued by the Chief of the General 
Headquarters of the SFRY Armed Forces on 14th May 1990 “for the safe 
storage and safeguarding of the TO’s weapons and ammunition.”9 General 
Veljko Kadijević justified the action by claiming that control of the weap-
ons came under the exclusive prerogatives of the JNA, and not of the repub-
lics that had no rights to them. He reassured the republics by saying that the 
possibility existed of returning the weapons if “good protective” conditions 
could be provided.10 Although a portion of local municipalities took steps to 
put such conditions into place, the JNA never returned the arms.11
6 SSNO, Generalštab JNA, I. Uprava, DT. br. 374-184/87 of 10 November 1988, Naređenje; 
Komanda 5. armije, DT br. 7-1 of 23 January 1989., Izvještaj o borbenoj gotovosti za 1988. 
godinu; SSNO, Generalštab JNA, I. Uprava, DT. br. 68-1 of 16 December 1986, Naređenje; 
SSNO, GŠ OS SFRJ, I Uprava, SP. br. 532-1 of 14 March 1989, “Dogradnja i razvoj rukovođenja 
i komandovanja u oružanim snagama,” “Ratna mornarica,” Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945.-
1985. (Beograd: 1988); Problemi oružane borbe na JPV u početnom i narednom periodu rata 
(1987), pp. 263.
7 “Reforma i višestranački sistem,” Narodna armija (Beograd), 24 May 1990, p. 8; Dušan 
Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 1999), pp. 775-777.
8 Komanda 5. VO, Str. pov. br. 9/75-180 of 22 May 1990, Izveštaj o realizaciji zadataka veza-
nih za preuzimanje naoružanja i municije TO. The Report is stored at the archive of the 
Parliament of the Republic of Croatia.
9 SSNO, GŠ OS SFRJ, Str. pov. br. 19-1 of 14 May 1990., Naređenje. Published in Davor 
Marijan, Smrt oklopne brigade (Zagreb-Sarajevo: Naklada ZORO, 2002), pp. 246-248. 
10 B. Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, pp. 146-147.
11 Republika Hrvatska, Ministarstvo obrane, Klasa 213-01/90-01/01, Ur. br. SP. 512-02-04-
90-12 of 25 10. 1990., Zahtjev za vraćanje naoružanja i municije u skladišta TO DPZ.
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Organisational and structural changes in the 1st and 5th Military Districts 
as well as in the Naval District followed the seizure of the TO’s weapons. 
In the 1st Military District, the JNA reclassified the 10th Motorised Brigade 
in Mostar and the 329th Armoured Brigade in Banja Luka from class “B” to 
class “A” status.12 The Mostar Brigade contained two armoured battalions. 
In the Naval District, the “B” class 221st Motorised Brigade in Knin similar-
ly went through restructuring, receiving an “A” class armoured and mecha-
nised battalion.13
But the most important changes occurred in the 5th Military District. In 
late June 1990, the JNA dissolved the 6th Proletarian Infantry Division and 
the Command of the defense of the city of Zagreb. A wider Zagreb area 
including Kordun and Banovina became a part of the newly established 10th 
Corps based in Zagreb. The establishment of the 10th Corps had not been 
foreseen in the “Unity 2 and 3” Plans.14 The new Corps received units from 
the 13th and 32nd Corps as well as from the Command of the 5th Military 
District. With the creation of the 10th Corps, the JNA effectively separated 
itself from the TO of the city of Zagreb.
In addition, in the 5th Military District the JNA awarded class “A” status to 
the 265th Mechanised Brigade in Bjelovar and Koprivnica, the 13th Proletarian 
Motorised Brigade in Rijeka and Ilirska Bistrica, the 1st Armoured Brigade 
in Vrhnika (Slovenia), the 580th Composite Artillery Brigade in Karlovac, 
and the 288th Composite Counter-Armour Artillery Brigade in Virovitica 
and Križevci. With these changes, the reorganised units gained better fire 
and strike power as well as better off-road mobility.15 Developments that 
followed would show that, until the outbreak of open conflict in the sum-
mer of 1991, the majority of these units would participate in the creation of 
what JNA propaganda called “buffer zones” which the JNA used to obstruct 
the work of the legal bodies of Croatia’s Interior Ministry.
The reclassification of certain units in the 5th Military District as a “A” 
class ones represented an attempt to surmount the JNA’s dependence on 
manpower in areas where Croats constituted a majority of the population. 
Recruits from other parts of Yugoslavia manned these units. The preference 
for using armoured and mechanised compositions in the District had been 
12 “A” class units consisted of those which had an effectiveness rate of 60% to 100%, “B” class 
of 15% to 60% and “R” class of up to 15%.  Such rates had been based on the wartime struc-
ture of the units.  The personnel base of “A” class units consisted of soldiers providing regular 
military service.  According to Yugoslav doctrine, such units could quickly reach combat 
formation and be ready for use.
13 SSNO, GŠ OS SFRJ, I Uprava, Br. 1487-171/89 of 15 May 1990, Naređenje.
14 Komanda 5. vojne oblasti, DT Br. 2-14 of 24 January 1991, Izvještaj o realizaciji zadataka 
iz plana “JEDINSTVO-2 i 3”, u 1990. godini.
15 SSNO, GŠ OS SFRJ, I Uprava, Br. 1487-171/89 of 15 May 1990., Naređenje; Komanda 
5. vojne oblasti, DT Br. 2-14 of 24 January 1991, Izvještaj o realizaciji zadataka iz plana 
“JEDINSTVO-2 i 3”, u 1990. godini.
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in keeping with the beneficial results such units brought to the JNA in its 
suppression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in the early and late 1980s.16
Apart from the above changes, the JNA initiated the preparation of new 
plans concerning procedures in states of emergency. Yugoslav defense poli-
cy defined a state of emergency as a threat to the political and government 
system presented by joint activities of internal and external enemies.17 Such 
threats formed the basis for the imposition of a state of emergency which 
than had to be consented to by the republics and the SFRY Presidency. In 
the late 1980s, the JNA unsuccessfully sought to change these procedures 
to provide for centralised assessment and decision making concerning the 
elimination of state of emergency. According to the JNA, this should have 
been an exclusive power of the SFRY Presidency and not one shared with 
the republics.18
The JNA faced the issue of imposing a state of emergency in Croatia 
immediately after the HDZ attained power.19 In the summer 1990, the 
Command of the 5th Military District prepared plans of action against the 
new government.20
The initial uprising of Croatia’s Serbs in summer 1990 started the crisis in 
the Republic of Croatia. On 17 August, armed Serb civilians placed obstacles 
on roads just outside of Knin. The JNA’s Air Force prevented a special unit of 
the Croatian Interior Ministry to intervene in Knin to suppress the distur-
bances. The SFRY Federal Secretariat for National Defense claimed that the 
Air Force’s intervention had been required since the Croatian Ministry’s heli-
copters carrying the special unit failed to provide prior notice and to obtain 
corridor clearance.21 This attack on Croatia’s sovereignty received strong 
support from Serbs during rallies held in Bosanska Krajina and Serbia.22 
Disturbances spread quickly through northern Dalmatia and Lika in vil-
lages with Serb majorities. An attempt then followed to spread unrest and 
16 The then President of the Presidency of SFRY, Borisav Jović, confirms in his memoirs 
that he had been told on 8th June 1990 by the Minister of Defence, General Veljko Kadijević, 
that they had “made the decision on establishing special motorised corps in the regions of 
Zagreb, Knin, Banjaluka and Herzegovina, which would be able, if needed, to function in the 
same way as in Kosovo.” B. Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, p. 152.
17 Strategija općenarodne obrane i društvene samozaštite SFRJ, p. 133.
18 More detailed on that in Raif Dizdarević, Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije (Sarajevo: 
Svjetlost, 2000), pp. 401-405, and pp. 409-410.
19 The new Directive on the use of SFRY AF in the state of emergency was brought by the 
SFRY AF General Staff on 21st May 1990.  Komanda 5. VO, DT broj 38-1 of 16 August 1990., 
Direktiva za upotrebu jedinica 5. VO u vanrednim prilikama.
20 Davor Marijan, “Oružane snage SFRJ u izvanrednim prilikama,” Časopis za suvremenu 
povijest 34 (2002), No. 2: 368-370.
21 “Armija ima zadatak da spreči bratoubilački rat,” Narodna armija, 23 August 1990, p. 5; 
Two years later, the Government of the rebellious Croatia’s Serbs passed the decision “Stating 
… that  the war in the area of the Republic of Srpska Krajina started” on 17 August 1990. 
Republika Srpska Krajina, Vlada, br. 04-3-270/92 of 28 July 1992, Odluka.
22 B. Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, pp. 178-179.
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destabilise government institutions in the area of Petrinja (in Banovina), a 
region with a mixed population with a Croat majority but with Serb villages 
in marginal portions of the area. Local Serbs took large quantities of weap-
ons and ammunition from several police stations.23 The favourable deploy-
ment of the 9th Corps within the Knin area enabled the Serbs to organ-
ise their armed forces without any interruption and to spread disturbanc-
es to other parts of Croatia. Since Croatia’s armed forces could not match 
those of the JNA, Croatia’s leadership did not dare enter into a direct conflict 
with JNA. The amount of arms held by Croatia did not promise any success 
against the well-armed federal army.
The poorly equipped Croatians had to obtain arms in any possible way in 
order to be able to suppress the revolt which represented a political and an 
economic attack on the young Croatian state.
The JNA used the illegal acquisition of arms by Croatia as justification to 
overthrow the legally elected government. Based on a JNA report concern-
ing the unauthorised organization of armed paramilitary units, the SFRY 
Presidency decided on 9 January 1991 to abolish them.24 This decision clear-
ly showed how unbridgeable differences had become. From the point of 
view of the Croatian Government, “paramilitary units” consisted of the rebel 
Serbs in Knin while the JNA considered the legally organised units with-
in the Croatian Ministry of the Interior to come within the definition. After 
the failure to disarm, the JNA started an intensive media campaign in late 
January 1991 against Croatia. The campaign resulted in the arrest of several 
Croatian citizens and the Military Court in Zagreb brought charges against 
the Croatian Minister of Defense, General Martin Špegelj.25
An attack by insurgent Serbs on the police station in Pakrac on 1 March 
1991 and the disarmament of its Croat police officers intensified tensions 
in Croatia. A day later, a special unit of the Croatian Interior Ministry 
crushed the insurgents in town. Without SFRY Presidency authorization, the 
President of the SFRY Presidency, Borisav Jović, ordered the JNA to engage 
in Pakrac. JNA forces from Bjelovar, Virovitica and Zagreb went to Pakrac 
and the 32nd Corps set up its forward command post in the town. The Chief 
of Staff of the 5th Military District, Lieutenant-General Dobrašin Praščević, 
stated in Pakrac that the JNA came to prevent “inter-ethnic conflict, by act-
ing preventively: to show the people and assure them that they will not be 
left at the mercy of special police officers, and for them [the police] to see, 
‘in the flesh,’ our determination not to allow [destruction] and bloodshed.”26 
23 “Vojska je prigrlila narod,” Narodna armija, 11 October 1990, pp. 4-5; “Otuđeno oružje”, 
Narodna armija, 11 October 1990, p. 15.
24 “Rasformirati sve neregularne oružane sastave,” Narodna armija, 17 January 1991, p. 4; 
“Naredba Predsjedništva SFRJ,” Narodna armija, 26 January 1991, p. 8; Veljko Kadijević, Moje 
viđenje raspada, (Beograd: Politika, 1993), p. 111.
25 “Istina o naoružavanju terorističkih formacija HDZ u Hrvatskoj (2),” Narodna armija, 28 
February 1991.
26 “Narod zaštićen od nasilja,” Narodna armija, 7 March 1991, p. 4; B. Jović, Poslednji dani 
SFRJ, pp. 281-282.
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The way in which JNA acted in Pakrac served as a “formula” for its conduct 
in the following several months. In its press and pronouncements, it labeled 
its actions as involving the creation of “buffer zones,” though the actual pur-
pose of such “zones” had been to keep tensions elevated, to obstruct the 
work of Croatian security authorities and to secure existing Serbian terri-
torial gains.
Events in Pakrac triggered a request of the Supreme Command Staff to 
the SFRY Presidency session held between 12 and 15 March 1991 to declare 
a state of emergency in the country and to suspend all legal “acts which are 
contrary to the Constitution of SFRY and federal laws.” By a four to four 
vote, the Presidency of SFRY refused to grant the request. Only Montenegro 
and Serbia together with the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and 
Kosovo voted in favor of the demand.27 The root of all these problems lied 
with the new multiparty system in which non-communist parties had won 
in Croatia and Slovenia. The JNA’s leaders, acting as the long arm of the 
Serbian political leadership, saw as the only solution the return to the old 
The JNA agressive plan against Croatia from September to October 1991.
27 V. Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, p. 113; B. Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, pp. 286-295.
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system.28 The JNA thus took another step away from its Constitutional obli-
gations and one step closer to its transformation into the armed force of the 
Serb nation, both within and outside Serbia. This led to the JNA’s active role 
in the armament and training of insurgent Serbs in Croatia.29
Another serious incident occurred in late March 1991 when Serb mili-
tia groups placed barricades in Plitvice on the Slunj - Titova Korenica 
road. A Croatian special police unit intervened successfully but the arrival 
of armoured JNA units from the 1st and 5th Military Districts prevented its 
advance after setting up a “buffer zone” between the conflicted parties.30 This 
“buffer zone” began to spread after the Naval District and the 5th Military 
District closed all access roads to Kninska Krajina and a part of Lika, thus 
further hindering the activities of Croatian Interior Ministry forces.31
By May 1991, events moved with increasing speed. On 2 May in Borovo 
Selo near Vukovar, Serb forces ambushed and killed twelve Croatian police 
officers marking the beginning of an armed uprising in eastern Slavonia.32 
Disturbances spread around Vinkovci and Osijek, where the villages of 
Mirkovci and Tenja, protected by JNA “buffer zones,” became strong centres 
of the revolt. Tensions escalated and on 6 May the Supreme Command Staff 
ordered the JNA to be on alert and mobilised a portion of its combat units.33
In the first days of May, three new JNA battalions had been introduced 
into Croatia’s crisis areas - an armoured battalion in Petrinja and mechanised 
battalions in each of Vinkovci and Vukovar.34 The JNA failed in its attempt 
to bring an armoured battalion from Mostar to Split so that it instead relo-
cated the battalion to the Kupres area.35 The JNA also occupied two bridg-
es on the Danube which came under the guard of its land forces and river 
flotilla.36 Those moves established the preconditions for the introduction of 
additional JNA forces in to Croatia.
28 After that session, in which the Greater-Serbian option did not succeed to take over 
the power in the country legally, JNA inclined toward the opposite option, which meant, as 
admitted by General Kadijević himself, “the protection and defence of the Serbian nation 
outside Serbia and gathering of JNA within the borders of the future Yugoslavia”. V. Kadijević, 
Moje viđenje raspada, pp. 113-114.
29 Komanda 18. korpusa, Pov. br. 7-397/8 of 26 August 1994, GŠ SVK, Predlog; Srpska Vojska 
Krajine, Generalštab, Odjeljenje bezbjednosti, S.P. br. 321-99 of 16 10. 1994, GŠ Republike 
Srpske, Zahtjev.
30 “Armija vraća mir,” Narodna armija, 4 Apr. 1991, pp. 4-5; “Ratni put popločan pobjedama”, 
Srpska vojska, 9 May 1994, p. 14.
31 Komanda 9. korpusa, DT- 1-4 of 5 April 1991, Zapovest za odbranu Op. br. 1.
32 Komanda 5. korpusa RV i PVO, Organ bezbednosti, SP. Br. 20-524 of 24 May 1991, Izjava 
vodnika Srđana Mitrovića iz VP 7660/7 Lučko.
33 “Podići borbenu gotovost JNA”, Narodna armija, 9 May 1991, p. 5.
34 Komanda 5. Vojne oblasti of 12 5. 1991, Izvješće sa obilaska i kontrole 622. mtbr i 4. okbr; 
Hrvatski informativni centar (in further text: HIC): Komanda 17. korpusa, DT. br. 11/1-93 of 
14 May 1991, Naređenje. 
35 “Ljudi i tehnika odolijevaju svim iskušenjima,” Narodna armija, 23 May 1991, pp. 15-16.
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The short war in Slovenia started on the morning of 27 June 1991 when 
the JNA sought to occupy the Slovenian border and set up federal police 
and customs forces on the frontier.37 The conflict spread quickly but ended 
without major clashes and led to the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia. 
For Croatia, this withdrawal meant that the JNA’s technical potential would 
be redeployed to neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.38
During the conflict in Slovenia, the 1st Military District’s armoured and 
mechanised units had been deployed on the “so-called administrative bor-
der” between Croatia and Serbia. This operational development had been 
planned as a clear demonstration of force to show the disproportionate quan-
tity and quality of weaponry of the JNA in comparison to Croatian armed 
forces. Moreover, the JNA made a further show of its intentions through its 
takeover of the bridges spanning the Danube separating Croatia and Serbia. 
The capture of the bridges sent a message that the Danube could not act as 
great natural obstacle keeping Serbian tanks away from Croatia.
At the border near Šid, the JNA deployed two brigades: the 1st Proletarian 
Guards Mechanised Brigade from Belgrade and the 453rd Mechanised Brigade 
from Sremska Mitrovica. The 36th Mechanised Brigade from Subotica took 
over Baranja and the bridge between Bezdan and Betina, while the bridge 
and the wider area around Bogojevo came under the control of the 51st 
Mechanised Brigade from Pančevo. A unit from the 12th Corps captured 
the bridge on the Danube between Ilok and Bačka Palanka. In Osijek, a part 
of the 12th Proletarian Mechanised Brigade barricaded itself in its barracks, 
while another part took control of the roads leading out of the city, portray-
ing their actions as an exercise.39
Along with preparing for war, the JNA also modified its command structure. 
During the conflict in Slovenia, numerous personnel changes occurred in the 
5th Military District. A Serb, General Života Avramović, the commander of 3rd 
Military District, replaced General Konarad Kolšek, a Slovene. Another Serb, 
Colonel Ljubomir Bajić, replaced Slovene Major-General Marjan Rožič as the 
commander of the 5th Air Force Corps and its anti-aircraft defense forces.40 
Such changes represented a clear expression of distrust toward non-Serb per-
sonnel. As a result, leading positions in the 5th Military District became filled 
by members of the same ethnic group which had normally dominated the 
officers corps. According to a statement of the Command of the 5th Military 
District in Slovenia and Croatia, 57% of its officers consisted of Serbs, followed 
36 “Odjekuje neka druga pjesma”, Narodna armija, 7 August 1991, p. 11; “Opstajavaju vojnički 
mostovi”, Narodna armija, 20 June 1991, p. 23; Marko Malović, Ostajemo u Iloku, second edi-
tion, (Zagreb: Tiskara Impress, 2000), p. 27.
37 “Nametanje rata,” Narodna armija, 6 July 1991, p. 3.
38 “Izraz političke realnosti,” Narodna armija, 20 July 1991, p. 4; SVA MORH: SSNO, GŠ OS 
SFRJ, I Uprava, Br. 51-1 of 25 July 1991, Naređenje.
39 D. Marijan, Smrt oklopne brigade, p. 160.
40 “Nova postavljenja,” Narodna armija, 6 July 1991, p. 4.
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by Croats with 12%, Slovenes with 6%, Montenegrins with 5%, Yugoslavs with 
4% and other ethnicities with 16%.41
The war began without any official declaration. Serb populated villag-
es, such as Tenja outside of Osijek, Mirkovci near Vinkovci and Borovo Selo 
near Vukovar, became support bases for rebel Serbs, Chetniks and the JNA. 
Beginning in July, Chetnik groups and rebel Serb units, using heavy weap-
onry, began their military campaign in Croatia and to ethnically cleanse 
everyone not Serbian. Despite the numerical superiority of Croatian forc-
es, the armored and mechanized forces of the JNA thwarted every attempt 
by Croatia to overcome the rebels and their allies from Serbia, such as 
near Mirkovci and Tenja on 5-7 July 1991. The JNA openly sided with the 
Chetniks. In some cases, the JNA even designated zones which would be 
under its “protection,” as in the case of the village of Mirkovci, and then 
tried to expand the zone over areas held by Croatian forces.42
On 11 July, rebel Serbs mobilised their staffs and military units.43 Protected 
by the JNA, they could further develop their military organisation. They 
had initially established their military structure immediately after events in 
Knin in August 1990. The process of building on this initial start turned out 
to be slow and rather inefficient due to conflicts among rebel leaders. These 
disputes centered in Knin where several paramilitary formations had been 
established by mid-1991. Apart from the police and the TO forces the reb-
els’ inherited (or, more accurately, forcibly separated from Croatia), smaller 
groups had also been established among rebel Serbs, ranging from Captain 
Dragan’s special forces to armed units of various political parties whose 
manpower came mostly from Serbia.44
In late July, the Serbian Autonomous Region (Srpska autonomska oblast) 
(SAO) Krajina, into which territory controlled by the rebel Serbs had been 
organized, established regional TO headquarters for Kordun and Banovina.45 
At a session held on 1 August 1991, its Government determined that the 
SAO’s armed forces would consist of the TO under the command Milan 
Babić, the head of the SAO Krajina Government and its Minister of Defense. 
A decision of the SAO’s Ministry of Internal Affairs passed in August con-
cerning the organisation of the defense system provided that the headquar-
ters of the Krajina TO would oversee the municipal TOs for each of Knin, 
Benkovac, Obrovac, Gračac, Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica and the zonal 
TOs for Kordun and Banija. The SAO appointed its Interior Minister, Mile 
Martić, as TO Deputy Commander and as a member of the TO staff for 
41 “Napadnuto je sve jugoslovensko,” Narodna armija, 6 July 1991, p. 6.
42 Komanda Garnizona Vinkovci, Pov. br. 42-1 of 26 July 1991, Obavijest.
43 SAO Krajina, Predsjednik Vlade/Ministar obrane, Br. 142-91-3 of 11 July 1991, 
Naređenje.
44 Komanda 5. korpusa RV i PVO, Organ bezbednosti, SP. Br. 6-369 of 14 May 1991, 
Zapažanja o stanju na terenu SO Vukovar.
45 Order SAO Krajina, Vlada, Br. 157/91-1 of 26 July 1991, Naređenje.
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police units.46 By 20 August 1991, the structure of the TO operational zones 
for SAO Krajina had been completed. The 1st Operational Zone took up 
northern Dalmatia, the 2nd Operational Zone took up Kordun, and the 3rd 
Operational Zone encompassed the area of Banovina.47
The combat value of these forces remained rather modest, although by the 
end of September 1991 they had more heavy weaponry than the Croatian 
Army and Police forces. These various groups had no ability to carry out 
larger operations and only the JNA’s imposition of “buffer zones” prevented 
their total rout and military defeat by Croatian forces.
Following the establishment of the rebel Serbs’ armed forces, they began 
attacks aimed at the “cleansing” of the Croat population. After eastern 
Slavonia, they opened another crisis area in late July in the Banovina area 
where the rebel Serbs’ TO from the municipality of Dvor na Uni, organised 
into the 1st Dvor unit, took part in the “fight for the complete liberation of the 
municipality.”48 Two Croat villages came under attack, Zamlača and Struga, 
while a mechanised unit of 329th Armoured Brigade waited nearby.49 Further 
north, an armed battalion of the 51st Mechanised Brigade attacked the Glina 
police station, thus contributing to the cleansing of Croats from Banovina.50 
The main body of the 51st Mechanised Brigade in eastern Slavonia did not 
remain aloof. After an attack of Serb paramilitary groups on the Dalj police 
station on 1 August, the Brigade, backed by air support, openly engaged in 
combat on the rebel and Chetnik side. The attack resulted in the deaths of 
several dozen Croats and the expulsion of hundreds more from the villages 
of Dalj, Aljmaš and Erdut. The main body of the Brigade went westwards, to 
the Serb populated village of Bijelo Brdo and entrenched itself there.51 After 
Erdut, Dalj and Aljmaš had been “cleansed,” the communication systems of 
parts of the 12th and 17th Corps joined together “with the aim of keeping 
surveillance over paramilitary formations,” as they called Croatian forces, as 
well as undertaking “joint actions against them.”52 By the end of August, the 
36th Mechanised Brigade, reinforced by Chetniks and other local Serb para-
military groups, occupied Baranja.53
46 SAO Krajina, Vlada, Predsjednik, Br. 179/91-1 of 8 August 1991, Naređenje
47 SAO Krajina, Vlada, Predsjednik, Str. pov. br. 189/91-1 of 20 August 1991, Naređenje.
48 “Prvi pješadijski bataljun,” Bilten 33. pješadijske brigade (Dvor na Uni), December 1994, p. 3.
49 SAO Krajina, Opština Dvor, Štab TO, Drugi bataljun, Zaključak of 12 September 1991; 
Izvješće pomoćnika načelnika Štaba za ONP 329. oklopne brigade.
50 “Principijelno ponašanje armije”, Narodna armija, 31 July 1991, p. 6.
51 Vojni sud Osijek, Kir-36/92 of 6. March 1992, Saslušanje I.K., zapovjednika voda u 51. 
mehaniziranoj brigadi JNA; “Razoružanje ili rat,” Narodna armija, 22 August 1991, p. 13; “Rat 
- surova škola taktike,” Narodna armija, 19 March 1992, p. 24.
52 HIC: Komanda 17. korpusa, Str.pov.br. 11/1566-2 of 4 August 1991, Naređenje.
53 “Šeksovi jastrebovi nisko lete,” Narodna armija, 7 September 1991, p. 23; “Duž linije što 
spaja i razdvaja,” Narodna armija, 9 October 1991, pp. 11-12.
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In western Slavonia, on 13th August, local Serbs proclaimed the SAO of 
Western Slavonia and joined it to the SAO Krajina. Their paramilitary units 
attacked a unit of the Croatian Police and National Guard Corps (ZNG) 
in Okučani on 16th August.54 On 16th August, the combat unit of the 265th 
Mechanised Brigade arrived from Bjelovar. A part of the 329th Armoured 
Brigade entered Okučani from Bosnia and Herzegovina and attacked troops 
of the ZNG and Croatian Police units.55 The JNA’s leaders rejected Croat 
accusations that this action had been an act of aggression by it, arguing that 
the engagement of forces of the 1st Military District and units of the Banja 
Luka Corps had been necessary “in order to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts in 
its zone of responsibility.”56
Conscripts from Croatia and Slovenia no longer served in the JNA and 
questions arose in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning con-
scription after the draft class of June 1990 had been discharged. As a result, 
JNA forces in Croatia and Slovenia found themselves in a difficult situation. 
Compulsory military service in the western part of Yugoslavia had been 
totally disrupted and the JNA lacked new soldiers to replace those who had 
fulfilled their one-year military service requirement. In some regions, the 
JNA could not replace former soldiers in sufficient numbers. The JNA no 
longer had at its disposal a sufficient number of soldiers to maintain the 
“buffer zones” and to garrison its barracks.
After a three-day session the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia adopt-
ed a resolution on 3rd August which requested that the JNA withdraw to its 
barracks and leave the territory of the Republic within a reasonable peri-
od of time as part of the process of separating Croatia from Yugoslavia.57 As 
the JNA turned a deaf ear to the Parliament’s resolution and went on with 
its aggression, Croatian forces started applying pressure on JNA barracks in 
early September.
The JNA’s military leaders rejected an order given to them by the new 
Croat President of the Presidency of SFRY, Stipe Mesić, on 11th September 
to withdraw JNA forces into its barracks within 48 hours. The JNA claimed 
Mesić’s order to be unlawful. The JNA also denied that that the rebel Serb’s 
TO forces acted “under the command and within JNA.”58
The blockade of the JNA’s barracks forced the JNA to speed up its plans as 
a risk existed that the Croats would get hold of heavy weaponry and modern 
equipment. The Supreme Command Staff of the SFRY armed forces threat-
54 Kronologija rata: agresija na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu 1989.-1998., (Zagreb: HIC-
Slovo, 1998), p. 84.
55 “Čovek kriznih žarišta,” Narodna armija, 22 December 1991, p. 26; “Ratni put popločan 
pobjedama,” Srpska vojska, 9 May 1994, p. 14.
56 “Ponovljene ratne slike,” Narodna armija, 22 August 1991, p. 12.
57 “Teror nad istinom,” Narodna armija, 7 August 1991, p. 5.
58 “Neovlašćeno i samovoljno izdavanje naređenja,” Narodna armija, 14 September 1991, 
p. 6.
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ened that they would destroy one vital facility in the city home to any JNA 
facility or barracks which the Croats seized. The threat also served as “a warn-
ing to the civilian population to withdraw in due time from those towns.”59 
By that time, the JNA had already begun to engage in strategic offensive 
operations. The commencement of these operations had been followed by 
a decision by the Serbian members of the SFRY Presidency to “take on cer-
tain competencies of the SFRY Assembly which cannot meet.” That deci-
sion called for all actions of the SFRY Presidency to be decided “by a major-
ity vote of the SFRY Presidency members present” at meetings of that body. 
The Vice-President of the Presidency, Dr. Branko Kostić, who practically 
usurped the role of President, said afterwards that “the Presidency of SFRY 
will not use military force to impose its will on any nation in Yugoslavia.”60 
At the same time, however, the JNA continued to use a majority of its forc-
es to impose the will of the political and military leaders of the largest ethic 
group in the SFRY, the Serbs, on the second largest, the Croats.
The JNA’s major military operations began in mid-September. The JNA 
planned, in co-operation with rebel Serbs, to defeat the Croatian army and 
complete the withdrawal of its remaining forces from Slovenia.61 Its opera-
tional blueprint anticipated the use of fifteen to eighteen armoured, mech-
anised and infantry Army brigades in addition to the JNA forces already 
engaged in Croatia. As General Veljko Kadijević admitted, the JNA’s plans 
“consisted of the following basic components: - totally blocking Croatia 
from air and from sea and directly linking the attacks of the JNA’s main 
forces as closely as possible to the liberation of Serb areas in Croatia and 
JNA barracks deeper in Croatian territory. To that end, the JNA would criss-
cross Croatia in the directions of Gradiška-Virovitica; Bihać-Karlovac-
Zagreb; Knin-Zadar; and Mostar-Split. Through the use of its strongest 
group of armoured and mechanised forces, [the JNA would] liberate east-
ern Slavonia and then quickly continue operations westward, meeting [its] 
forces in western Slavonia, and proceed towards Zagreb and Varaždin or 
towards the Slovenian border. At the same time, using strong forces from the 
area of Herceg Novi-Trebinje, [the JNA would] block Dubrovnik from land 
and reach the Neretva River valley, and thus join forces heading in the direc-
tion of Mostar-Split. [Thereafter,] the JNA would secure and hold the bor-
der of Srpska Krajina in Croatia, remove remaining JNA units from Slovenia 
and then withdraw the JNA from Croatia. The mobilisation, preparation of 
. . . units, as well as bringing them to planned routes of deployment would 
take ten to fifteen days, depending on the units’ level of combat prepared-
ness and [their] distance from the routes of deployment.”62 In the first days 
of the operation, Kadijević openly said that “the Army at this moment does 
59 “Poslednje upozorenje,” Narodna armija, 2 October 1991, p. 7.
60 “Neposredna ratna opasnost uslovljava rad,” Narodna armija, 5 October 1991, p. 3.
61 V. Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, p. 134.
62 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
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not want anything more than to establish control over crisis areas, protect 
the Serb population from persecution and destruction, and free JNA mem-
bers and their families.” He emphasised that “the defeat the Ustasha forces” 
remained the precondition to achieve these goals.63
In its operation, the JNA planned to have its forces intersect with one 
another and force Croatia’s unconditional surrender and acceptance of any 
Serb demands. However, the poor response of reservists in the 1st and 3rd 
Military Districts put the JNA’s extensive designs into question.64 The JNA 
tried to find a way out of its problem by taking on volunteers, for which it 
issued a special instruction. According to that document, volunteers had the 
same rights as military personnel and conscripts. Every volunteer had to 
complete an application form by which he became obliged to obey “federal 
laws and other acts, as well as orders regulating the relations, life and work 
in the Yugoslav People’s Army.”65 In this manner, the JNA brought into its 
fold various Serbian party paramilitary groups. The common aim, the cre-
ation of a Greater Serbia, erased all the ideological and political differences 
between them and the JNA.
The rebel Serbs obtained large-scale personnel reinforcements to carry 
out their war against Croatia. On 20 September, the JNA sent many of its 
senior and junior officers to take over the leadership of local Serb TO units.66 
In late September, the structure of the Serb TO units finally became settled. 
The authorities split the area of northern Dalmatia and Lika into two zones: 
the first for Dalmatia, which came under direct command of headquarters 
of the TO of the SAO Krajina, while the second became an operational zone 
for Lika. The areas of Kordun and Banovina became joined into one, third 
operational zone.67 The other armed component, the militia, on 9 October 
came under the command of TO commanders during combat actions.68
The JNA’s attack focused on eastern Slavonia. The armoured and mech-
anised group in eastern Slavonia and Srijem consisted of the main body of 
the 12th Corps and the 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanised Division, rein-
forced by units from the 24th and 37th Corps. Having occupied Baranja, the 
12th Corps directed its main force against Vukovar, while the remainder of 
its troops attacked Osijek. The battle for Vukovar became the most diffi-
cult task for the units of the 1st Military District and the attack unexpect-
edly became prolonged. Vukovar became less and less a military problem 
63 “U Hrvatskoj je na djelu neonacizam,” Narodna armija, 5 October 1991, p. 5.
64 B. Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, pp. 385-386; Ofelija Backović, Miloš Vasić, and Aleksandar 
Vasović, “Ko to rado ide u vojnike - mobilizacijska kriza - analitički pregled medijskog izvje-
štavanja”, Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995, (Zagreb-Sarajevo: Jesenski i Turk-
Dani, 1999), pp. 355-356.
65 SSNO, GŠ OS SFRJ, III Uprava, Pov. br. 2391-1 of 13 September 1991, Uputstvo o prije-
mu dobrovoljaca u JNA.
66 Naređenje br. 24-175 načelnika Personalne uprave SSNO of 20 September 1991.
67 VRH: SAO Krajina, Vlada, Predsjednik,Pov. 1/1-91 of 5 10. 1991, Obavijest.
68 VRH: SAO Krajina, Vlada, Predsjednik, Br. 2/1-91 of 9 10. 1991, Naređenje.
309
  Review of Croatian History 1/2005, no.1., 295-317
and turned into a demonstration of the type of war JNA conducted for the 
Serbian cause. Logic dictated that the JNA should simply have blocked the 
town with small forces and bypassed it, but obviously the JNA did not have 
that idea in mind.
In its campaign to move forward into the central part of Croatia, the 
JNA did not want to leave any “unstable” situation behind. The forces of 
Operational Group “North,” under the command of Major-General Andrija 
Biorčević, and Operational Group “South,” under the command of Colonel 
Milo Mrkšić, captured Vukovar on 19 November 1991. The overall opera-
tion itself came under the command of General Života Panić, command-
er of the 1st Military District.69 Serbian journalists described the capture of 
the city as follows: “The liberators, JNA and TO units, and volunteer forc-
es, took [the city] house by house, saving the lives of their own men and 
citizens, showing ingenuity in fighting in populated areas, and reaffirming 
their humaneness and bravery.”70 They also claimed that “Vukovar [did not 
become] an occupied town. It is a town liberated from the darkest neo-
fascism and Ustasha ideology. Therefore, one should not ask if destruction 
could have been avoided. As long as neo-fascism persisted and remained 
stubborn, that much more force had been required for its destruction. No 
other choice existed.”71
Apart from capturing Vukovar, the JNA in eastern Slavonia threatened 
Vinkovci, Županja and Osijek. The 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanised 
Division captured the majority of villages in the municipality of Vukovar. 
The commander of the Division, Major-General Dragoljub Aranđelović, 
boasted that his forces had “cleansed and gotten a strong hold of the area 
between the Danube and the Bosut Rivers, and that public authorities had 
begun to be established in these areas.”72 His expression of truthfulness 
clearly stated the essence of JNA’s task: to ethnically cleanse Croatian lands 
of Croats and other non-Serb ethnic groups and to establish Serbian organs 
of power. The 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanised Division carried out the 
most characteristic example of the JNA’s goals when it oversaw the ethnic 
cleansing of the town of Ilok under the terms of a 14 October 1991 “agree-
ment” reached in Šid.73
The 5th Corps from Banja Luka tried to occupy western Slavonia. The 
Corps had been engaged previously due to the mass uprising of the local 
Serb population. The Corps obtained reinforcements for its great planned 
attacks from JNA forces stationed in Serbia and Macedonia and two brigades 
of the TO of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had drawn on reservists from 
69 SSNO, Kabinet saveznog sekretara, Br. 1023-2 of 21 November 1991, Pohvala načelnika 
Štaba Vrhovne komande.
70 “Oslobođen Vukovar,” Narodna armija, 20 November 1991, p. 3.
71 “Žrtvovani zarad separatizma,” Narodna armija, 23 November 1991, p. 15.
72 “Kao nekad, pod razvijenom ratnom zastavom,” Narodna armija, 2 October 1991, p. 4.
73 “Sporazum između predstavnika grada Iloka i Jugoslavenske narodne armije” of 14 10. 
1991; “Kao nekad, pod razvijenom ratnom zastavom,” Narodna armija of 2 October1991, p. 4.
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Bosanska Krajina. The Corps failed in its plan to penetrate towards Bjelovar 
and Varaždin in an attempt to join with forces of the 32nd Corps based there 
and in Virovitica. Had it succeeded, the battle for Slavonia would have ended 
to the advantage of the Serbs. After the surrender of the 32nd Corps, the forc-
es of the 5th Corps tried to extend their territorial hold around Okučani, 
Jasenovac and Hrvatska Kostajnica. In late October, Croatian forces stopped 
the Corps, and in early November, they started to gradually push it back 
towards Okučani and the Sava River; the Sarajevo truce put an end to their 
offensive.74
The 5th Military District Command conceived offensive operation in cen-
tral Croatia so that several operational groups would concentrate in a number 
of directions: (1) the 1st Operational Group consisting of elements of the 10th 
Corps, the rebel Serbs’ TO and reinforcements from Serbia would reach the 
Kupa River along a line stretching from Petrinja to Karlovac and enable the 
withdrawal of forces surrounded in the barracks in Karlovac and Zagreb; (2) a 
tactical group added from the 5th Corps would “cleanse” the area from Plitvice 
via Slunj all the way to Karlovac; (3) the main body of the 10th Corps, with 
the elements of units from the 5th Military District headquarters but with-
out forces from the 1st Operational Group, would withdraw via Velika Gorica 
towards Petrinja, and then further towards Dvor na Uni and Bosanski Novi; 
(4) apart from defending the JNA’s barracks in Rijeka and Delnice, the 13th 
Corps had the task to carry out an organised penetration in the general direc-
tion of Rijeka-Delnice-Vrbovsko-Slunj-Plitvice; and (5) elements of the 32nd 
Corps in Bjelovar and Koprivnica would penetrate in the direction Bjelovar-
Grubišno Polje-Daruvar and join the forces of the 5th Corps, would act behind 
the lines and become a part of its forces. These offensive activities would be 
supported by heavy artillery and the Air Force which had the task to strike 
vital targets in Zagreb.75 Orders to the 5th Military District clearly shows the 
JNA’s intention to withdraw its forces from ethnically unfavourable surround-
ings into areas with a Serb majority, while, at the same time, to reach the outer 
edges of areas with a Serb majority and simultaneously “cleansing” away the 
Croat population in the hinterland.
The extensive plans of the 5th Military District command failed, first of 
all because of the surrender of the 32nd Corps and the blockade of the main 
body of the forces of the 10th and 13th Corps and, second of all, because of 
the feeble response of reservists in Serbia but also in Bosanska Krajina. The 
1st Operational Group reached the Kupa River and the outskirts of Karlovac, 
which had been an easy task thanks to the favourable ethnic composition of 
the local population. However, attempts to reach Sisak, Moščenica, Komarevo 
and Sunja failed so that in November the front line became stable.76 In the 
74 V. Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, pp. 138-139; D. Marijan, Smrt oklopne brigade, pp. 
61-63.
75 Božidar Javorović, Narodna zaštita grada Zagreba u Domovinskom ratu, (Zagreb: Defimi, 
1999), p. 72; Komanda 1. OG, Str. pov. br. 100-233 of 19 10. 1991, Naređenje.
76 Iskustva u dosadašnjim b/d 1. OG.
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central and southeastern part of the 5th Military District, combat activities 
continued until the end of 1991. As the main body of the 13th Corps in Istria 
and Gorski Kotar became encircled and cut off from other JNA forces, the 9th 
Corps took over combat activities for the southern part of Lika, while, with 
respect to the rest of Lika and a part of Kordun, the 3rd Operational Group 
became organised under the direct command of the 5th Military District.
By mid-November, the JNA, with the support of local Serb units, occu-
pied Slunj and expelled all Croats from the town, thus completing their con-
trol over a compact area with a new Serb majority.77
In the area of northern Dalmatian, the 9th Corps, assisted by local Serb 
forces, engaged in combat activities until late spring. Thanks to the favour-
able location of its main body, the Corps had sufficient time to com-
plete its operational evolution. It represented one of the few JNA opera-
tional formations which did not have serious problems with manpower, as 
it had been built up in due time, with men partly from its own area and 
from Montenegro. The vast majority of the Corps’ men consisted of sev-
eral thousand reservists from Serbia, mostly Šumadija. In late August the 
Corps “cleared” the villages of Kijevo and Kruševo creating favourable con-
ditions for spreading its aggression against Croatian towns along the coast. 
By 1992, the Corps had engaged in ruthless attacks to “clear” the hinterland 
of Šibenik and Zadar.78
The SFRY Navy contributed to the war effort by imposing a naval block-
ade of Croatia’s Adriatic ports on 17 September 1991 and by providing 
fire support for the JNA naval sector and army units, focusing on the cit-
ies of Dubrovnik, Split, Zadar, Šibenik and Ploče.79 Apart from the Navy, 
two JNA operational groups became active in southern Croatia. The 37th 
Corps from Serbia received the task to operate in the direction of Mostar-
Split. Parts of its forces occupied areas of eastern and central Herzegovina 
in September.80 But, due to the feeble response of reservists, it had been 
forced to limit its task to secure the airport in Mostar and intimidate the 
non-Serb population in the area. East of the 37th Corps, the forces of the 2nd 
Corps and the 9th Naval Sector in the Boka Kotarska became active, with the 
472nd Motorised Brigade of the latter entrusted with the task of cutting off 
Dubrovnik “from the rest of the territory of the Republic of Croatia”81 The 
77 Komanda 5. vojne oblasti, Str. pov. br. 09/75-1034 of 10 November 1991, Komandi TG-2, 
Naređenje; Načelnik štaba II. OZ of 10 March 1992, Informacija o nekim problemima TO u Lici.
78 Komanda Vojnopomorske oblasti, Str. pov. br. 167-1/47-4153 of 21 September 1991, 
Naređenje; “Snažni udari armije”, Narodna armija,  9th October 1991, p. 35; V. Kadijević, Moje 
viđenje raspada, p. 139; Komanda 9. K, Str. pov. br. 747-1 of 2 December 1991, Referat Štabu 
Vrhovne komande.
79 Komanda Vojnopomorske oblasti, Str.pov.br. 167-1/47-911 of 20 September 1991, Zapovest 
za uporabu snaga VPO; “Mrtvo slovo primirja,” Narodna armija, 21 September 1991, p. 6.
80 Komanda 9. korpusa of 23 September 1991, Naređenje za pregrupiranje Op. br. 14.
81 Komanda Vojnopomorske oblasti, Str. pov. br. 167-1/47-4153 of 21. September 1991, 
Naređenje.
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Operation Group for Southern Herzegovina and Dalmatia, known as the 2nd 
Operation Group, coordinated their activities against Dubrovnik.82 Assaults 
on Dubrovnik began on 24 September. That these military actions became 
nothing less than overt Greater-Serbian aggression became clearly illustrat-
ed by the JNA’s involvement in the burning of the Croat village of Ravno in 
eastern Herzegovina, all of whose inhabitants had been expelled by the JNA. 
By 5th October, Prevlaka had been “cleansed” and pressure on Dubrovnik 
followed it had been cut off from the remainder of Croatia and shelled sev-
eral times.83
The great operation designed by JNA General Staff did not succeed as 
expected. Croatian forces stopped JNA army forces in November. Some 
moves, such as the attempted assassination of Croatia’s President on 7th 
October 1991 by a JNA Air Force attack on his offices, did not turn out as 
planned.84 A stalemate arose after the JNA’s goals had been only partial-
ly realized. Such a state of affairs in the long term became unfavourable to 
Greater-Serbian interests. The JNA had to accept its limited successes in the 
82 “Istina je probila sve barijere,” Narodna armija, 9 January 1992, p. 14.
83 Smail Čekić, Agresija na Bosnu i genocid nad Bošnjacima 1991-1993. (Sarajevo: Ljiljan, 
1994), p. 171; Trpimir Macan, Posljednja opsada Dubrovnika (Dubrovnik: Matica Hrvatska, 
2001).
84 Kronologija rata: agresija na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu 1989.-1998., p. 100.
High officers of the JNA on the 
Vukovar battlefront in November 
1991. Among them are war 
Criminals General Blagoje Adžić 
(Fourth from the right) and colonel 
Veselin Šljivančanin (third from the 
Right). Front page of the JNA week-
ly magazine Narodna armija from 6 
November 1991.
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hope that UN peacekeeping forces coming to the war zone would secure its 
territorial gains.
Under pressure from the international community, a compromise had 
been reached through a 22 November 1991 agreement on the relocation 
of remaining JNA forces of the 5th Military District from the territory of 
Croatia and leaving the Croatian side with weapons taken from the TO.85 By 
30 December 1991, the relocation process had been completed.86 After sign-
ing of an agreement on an unconditional ceasefire in Sarajevo on 2 January 
1992 between representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the JNA, com-
bat activities declined significantly. The arrival and deployment of UN 
peacekeeping units thereafter began along the demarcation line.87
At the very end of 1991, on 30 December, a new restructuring of the JNA 
took place which dissolved the 5th Military District. The JNA instead estab-
lished the 2nd Military District based in Sarajevo. It included the 10th Corps 
of the former 5th Military District, as well as the 4th, 5th and 7th Corps from 
the 1st Military District and the 9th Corps from the former Naval District. 
Three operational groups entered the 10th Corps: the 6th in Lika, the 7th in 
Banovina and the 8th in Kordun which had been created in the reorgani-
sation of the 1st and 3rd Operational Groups. JNA armed forces in eastern 
Herzegovina and Montenegro, which had been orientated towards the south 
of Croatia, became part of the structure of the 4th Military District.88
The initial few months of 1992 represented a short period during which 
the JNA had two tasks: it had to withdraw from the territory of the Republic 
of Croatia while protecting its territorial gains against Croatian armed forc-
es. This required the reorganisation of the armed forces of the rebel Serbs 
from a militia into an army and the creation of border units and police 
brigades.89 On 27 February 1992 an order of the Head of the General Staff of 
SFRY Armed Forces created a new military structure in the area temporari-
ly taken by JNA from the Croatian Republic. Pursuant to it, the TO General 
Headquarters of the Republic of Srpska Krajina (RSK) had been organized 
to oversee six TO zonal Headquarters with subordinate brigades.90 In mid-
March, the General Staff of the SFRY Armed Forces sent to the RSK’s TO 
Headquarters an “Instruction for the work of Territorial Defense headquar-
ters and units in the preparation and execution of demobilisation and remo-
bilization,” which included basic guidelines for demobilisation and mobil-
isation activities in “in the period after the withdrawal of JNA units from 
85 Sporazum između ovlaštenih predstavnika Vlade Republike Hrvatske i JNA, Zagreb, 22 
November 1991.
86 “Izmještanje do kraja izvršeno,” Narodna armija, 4 Apr. 1992, 4
87 Komanda 8. OG, Str. pov. br. 2-254 of 16 March 1992, Naređenje.
88 “Obrazovane četiri vojne oblasti,” Narodna armija, 4 January 1992, 4; Komanda 2. vojne 
oblasti, DT. br. 1-2 of 5 January 1992, Naređenje
89 Komanda 8. OG, Str. pov. br. 2-302 of 31 March 1992, Redovni borbeni izveštaj.
90 SSNO, GŠ OS SFRJ, III uprava, D.T. br. 892-2 of 2 March 1992, Naređenje.
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the territory of Krajina.”91 In accordance with an order given by the Head 
of the General Staff of the SFRY Armed Forces on 24 March 1992, the TO 
of RSK became subject to numerous organisational changes. A rear-echelon 
base had been established in Knin, while howitzer artillery battalions, mixed 
counter-armour divisions, light artillery anti-aircraft batteries and rear-ech-
elon bases had been located in each of the TO zones.92
Apart from the organisation of the local Serb paramilitary force, the 
Administration of Special Militia Units had been established at this time 
under the RSK Ministry of Defense. The Administration became charged 
with militia brigades which had to be established in Knin, Korenica, Vojnić, 
Petrinja, Okučani, Vukovar, Beli Manastir and Benkovac.93 On 22 April, the 
JNA sent a large number of officers with ranks ranging from captain 1st class 
to colonel to the RSK. The Commander of the TO General Headquarters of 
the RSK had determine to determine their deployments. In this manner, an 
experienced command structure consisting of active officers received the 
task to create the conditions for the efficient operations of the rebel Serbs’ 
armed force.94 By the end of April, the JNA managed to do what the lead-
ers of the rebel Serbs could not do since August 1990. Three separate areas, 
or the SAOs, as their creators called them, joined into the RSK, as the first of 
two Serb states outside Serbia.
Handover of the zones of responsibility to United Nations Protective Force 
(UNPROFOR) started in mid-May 1992, after which militias remained the 
only armed units in the territory of the so-called Krajina, while the remain-
ing armed forces had been demobilised and reduced to activities at their 
headquarters.95 This marked the end of the “official” phase of JNA actions in 
Croatia. Its members, as citizens of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(consisting of Serbia and Montenegro), withdrew from occupied areas of the 
Republic of Croatia. Pursuant to an order of its General Staff, the JNA had 
to withdraw its materiel and technical means and manpower from the ter-
ritories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina no later than 19 May 1992. 
Those units, which could not transfer all of their equipment, had to hand it 
over to units designated by the Command of the 2nd Military District.96
The Serbian war against the Republic of Croatia primarily represented a 
war for the territory of and against the Croatian people. The aim of the war 
can be reduced to three words - ethnically cleansed territory, and, to achieve 
that goal all possible means had been permitted.
One can see the outlines of three phases in the war. The first phase last-
ed between mid May-1990 and the beginning of March 1991. In that peri-
91 SSNO, GŠ OS SFRJ, III uprava, Str. pov. br. 1116-1 of 12 March 1992, Uputstvo.
92 SSNO, Str. pov. br. 1349-1 of 24 March 1992, Naređenje.
93 SSNO, Generalštab OS SFRJ, III uprava, Str. pov. br. 1943-2 of 28 April 1992, Naređenje.
94 Naređenje br. 2-77 načelnika Personalne uprave SSNO of 22 April 1992.
95 RSK, Glavni štab Teritorijalne obrane, Str. pov. br. 303/92 of 7 May 1992, Naređenje.
96 SSNO, GŠ OS SFRJ, Operativni centar, Br. 53-3 of 11 May 1992, Naređenje.
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od, JNA forces supported the beginning of the rebellion and prepared for 
the next phase. General Kadijević defined the aim of the JNA at the time 
as the protection of Serbs in Croatia “from attacks of Croatian armed for-
mations” and to enable them to “consolidate their military self-organisation 
for defense; at the same time, prepare the JNA for war against Croatia when 
Croatia starts it against the JNA.”97 His stated goals twisted undeniable facts. 
No attacks occurred on Serbs. What actually happened had been an armed 
uprising of militant segments of the Serb population against the legitimate 
authorities of the Republic of Croatia.
The second phase lasted from early March till the beginning of July 1991. 
During that phase, Serb rebels tried to extend their parastate to areas which 
did not have a favourable ethnic status for the Serbs but which contained 
“enough” Serbs to allow them to claim their right to yet another “centuries-
old” Serbian land. From that moment, JNA units became the unquestionable 
protector of rebel Serb forces. The JNA soon took on another, even more 
important task - the role of a participant in the same effort as a result of 
which the JNA took part in actions in Pakrac, Plitvice and eastern Slavonia 
during wish the initial victims had been killed. During this period, the JNA 
demonstrated the experience it had gained from the long-standing activi-
ties of the 52nd Corps units in Kosovo. In this phase, ethnic cleansing began, 
carried out by local rebel Serbs. Self-proclaimed TO undertook the task 
through threats and intimidation, after which they moved on to a much 
more open methods – the massacre of those deemed “unsuitable.” That very 
formula of open genocide proved to be most efficient in achieving the basic 
Serb aim - ethnically cleansing the population of Croats and other non-
Serbs. The formula proved suitable for the JNA as well, which continued to 
present itself as a neutral factor, whose basic task had been to create, as they 
called it, “buffer zones.” It always appeared in the right place at the right time 
to ensure the success of the rebels and to halt attempts of Croatian forces 
whenever things went wrong for the Serbs.
The beginning of July saw the start of the third phase of JNA actions 
against Croatia. Gradual and increased engagement, combining support to 
the rebels and the entry of newly arrived Serb groups, characterised this 
phase. In mid-September, the JNA launched an offensive against Croatia 
with the intention to pull its units out from areas which did not fall with-
in the proposed borders of Greater Serbia, while simultaneously attempt-
ing to install themselves on Greater Serbia’s imaginary borders. The reserv-
ists’ poor response from the first condemned this plan to failure so that the 
JNA instead carried out a reduced variant of the plan. During this period, 
the pretence of “preventing interethnic conflicts” became discarded and the 
purpose of JNA engagement became fully revealed. The claim to be fighting 
to unblock barracks lost any sense when it came to Dubrovnik and Vukovar 
because “no blocked barracks, or Serb population that needed protection” 
97 V. Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, p. 127.
316
D. MARIJAN, Aggression of the Jugoslav Army on Croatia  
could be found there, as Lord Carrington noted.98 The real nature of the war 
carried out by the JNA in the campaign against Dubrovnik and Vukovar 
had been uncovered.
Translated by Ida Jurković
Die Jugoslawische Volksarmee in der Agression gegen die 
Republik Kroatien 1990-1992
Zusammenfassung
Nach dem Tod von Josip Broz Tito im Jahre 1980 geriet die Sozialistische 
Föderative Republik Jugoslawien (SFRJ) in eine Kriese. Diese Jahre waren geprägt von 
den Geschehnissen in Kosovo 1981 und 1989, von langwierigen Wirtschaftskriesen 
und dem Erwachen des großserbischen Nationalismus, der sich gegen den in der 
Verfassung von 1974 angestrebten und verabschiedeten Föderalstaat richtete. Die 
Einbeziehung der Jugoslawischen Volksarmee (JNA) machte es offensichtlich, dass 
die Vorstellung von einem Großserbien tief in dieser sich selbst als Verteidiger von 
Titos Erbe verstehenden Institution verwurzelt war, in der die Serben die Mehrheit 
bildeten. Gegen Ende der 1980-er Jahre war laut dem Plan “Jedinstvo” (“Einheit”) die 
Restrukturierung der JNA abgeschlossen und hatte die Zentralisierung der Armee 
zum Ergebnis. Dieses geschah auf Kosten der als Element der Republikenarmee 
dienenden Territorialabwehr, und zugunsten der Jugoslawischen Volksarmee, die 
zuvor vom legalen Gesichtspunkt her gleichgestellt waren. Auf diese Weise konnten 
Oberhäupter des Militärs die politischen Mächte in Serbien und Montenegro offen 
unterstützen, die im Unterschied zu den restlichen Republiken einen zentralis-
tischen Staat anstrebten. Da ein Ende der bipolaren Spaltungen in der Welt in Sicht 
war, hatte diese Option der JNA keine reale Basis in der Form von Bedrohungen 
von Außen. 
Nach dem Sieg der demokratischen Kräfte in Kroatien und den daraus folgen-
den Veränderungen in der Regierung, entrüstete die Jugoslawische Volksarmee 
sogleich die Kroatische Territorialabwehr. Zur gleichen Zeit war die Umverteilung 
der Truppen in der Zagreber Region abgeschlossen und der 10. Armeekorps aufge-
baut, dessen Aufgabe es war, Unruhen in der Stadt durch die in den 80-er Jahren in 
Kosowo eingesetzten Taktik zu vermeiden.
Die Struktur der Truppen in bewaffneten und mobilisierten Einheiten in Kroatien 
und dessen Umfeld wurde bereits zu Friedenszeiten gestärkt, vorrangig in Gebieten 
in denen Kroaten die Mehrzahl der Bevölkerung bildeten. Auf diese Weise wurde 
die Abhängigkeit vom Personal reduziert, und, hinsichtlich der Stärke dieser mobi-
lisierten Einheiten erwartet, dass diese den Brennpunkt des bewaffneten Konfliktes 
in Kroatien darstellen werden.
Nach der Rebellion der serbischen Minderheit in Kroatien im August 1990, 
stellte sich die JNA unverzüglich an deren Seite. Bis Juli 1991 nahm die Armee an 
der Rebellion duch das Institut der “Pufferzone” teil, welche scheinbar die zwei 
98 Henry Wynaendts, U žrvnju, Jugoslovenska hronika jul 1991-avgust 1992 (Beograd: 
Radio B-92, 1996), p. 99.
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Konfliktseiten auseinanderhielt, während deren wirkliches Ziel war, der kroatischen 
Regierung bei der flächendeckenden Implementierung der Verfassung Steine in 
den Weg zu legen. Die den Rebellen seitens der JNA gebotene Unterstützung offen-
barte seit Juli 1991 die allmähliche Gewaltanwendung gegenüber den Streitkräften 
der kroatischen Regierung. Gegen Ende September begann die Jugoslawische 
Volksarmee mit der Implementierung strategischer Pläne, die auf die Zerspaltung 
des Landes und den Rücktritt der kroatischen Regierung hinausliefen. Danach 
sollte durch großangelegte Angriffe Kontrolle über diejenigen Gebiete gewonnen 
werden, die planmäßig zum Großserbien gehören sollten. Nach dem Mißerfolg die-
ser Operationen, gab sich die Jugoslawische Volksarmee mit Regionen zufrieden, 
in denen die Serben die Mehrheit bildeten. Vor ihrem Rückzug am Anfang des 
Jahres 1992, organisierte die JNA Streitkräfte unter den rebellierenden kroatischen 
Serben.

